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1REALITY BITES: 
The Limits of Intellectual Property Protection 
for Reality Television Shows
Matthew Bunker, Ph.D.*
Abstract
Reality television is an incredibly successful genre of entertainment. 
Reality TV has had enormous ratings success beginning in the early 2000s, 
and its influence (and revenues) are only likely to increase.  Given the value 
of these properties, an important issue for reality TV creators and producers is 
the degree to which intellectual property protection is available to stop com-
petitors from appropriating the content of reality programming.  This Article 
first documents the rise of the reality genre.  It then explores both copyright 
and trademark jurisprudence affecting reality plaintiffs and offers original 
analysis of this important aspect of intellectual property law.
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Introduction
Reality television is an incredibly successful genre of entertainment. 
Reality TV has had enormous ratings success beginning in the early 2000s and 
its influence and revenues are only likely to increase.  One huge advantage 
reality shows offer content providers over scripted comedies or dramas is that 
reality shows are much less expensive to produce.  One recent article on the 
phenomenon pointed out that “at between $350,000 and $500,000 per hour of 
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programming, the average unscripted series costs about one-fourth as much as 
a high-end drama, for which networks can pay up to $2 million per episode.”1
Reality TV also provides unique opportunities for marketers not present 
in scripted fare.  As one scholar put it, “[i]n an age of soaring production costs, 
commercial-zapping technologies, digital convergence, and increased audience 
fragmentation, reality television has also lent itself to experiments in inte-
grated branding, global franchising, and interactive marketing.”2
Given the value of these properties, a key issue for reality TV pro-
ducers is the scope of intellectual property protection provided by U.S. law. 
Although courts have generally been unsupportive of copyright infringement 
claims based on reality show formats—as they have been of television formats 
 generally—some recent cases suggest that protection via copyright, while dif-
ficult, may not be impossible.  Meanwhile, trademark claims regarding reality 
programs have for the most part been rejected.
Although a number of legal analyses of copyright issues in the reality 
genre appeared in the early 2000s,3 after the first rush of reality litigation, few 
commentators have analyzed the more recent cases, particularly those more 
favorable to plaintiffs.  This Article thus makes an original contribution to the 
literature by analyzing more recent decisions that, at the very least, clarify that 
under the proper circumstances, copyright protection is not out of reach for 
reality TV creators.  The Article also explores trademark issues that many pre-
vious scholars have not touched upon.
This Article first documents the appearance of reality TV in the United 
States and explores its continued importance.  Next, the Article briefly discusses 
the history of the genre.  It then elucidates particular copyright doctrines that 
lie at the heart of most reality copyright litigation and explores early cases in 
which defendants were inevitably victorious.  Next, the Article analyzes more 
recent cases that cast some doubt upon the claimed inability to copyright real-
ity TV formats.  The Article then briefly articulates trademark issues that have 
arisen in the reality context.  Finally, the Article offers concluding perspectives 
on these important intellectual property issues.
1 Josef Adalian, The Boom Days of Reality TV Are Over, Vulture (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.vulture.com/2015/09/reality-tv-boom-days-are-over.html [https://perma.cc/
V4U4-H4A4].
2 Laurie Ouellette, A Companion to Reality Television 3 (2017). 
3 See, e.g., Jesse Stalnaker, Has Reality Programming Been Voted Off the Island of Copy-
right Protection?  Finding Protection as a Compilation, 16 Seaton Hall J. Sports & Ent. 
L. 162 (2006); Daniel Fox, Harsh Realities: Substantial Similarity in the Reality Television 
Context, 13 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 223 (2006); Daniel A. Fiore & Samuel E. Rogoway, Re-
ality Check: A Recent Court Decision Indicates that Traditional Copyright Analysis May 
Be Used to Protect Reality TV Shows from Infringement, 28-Aug L.A. Law. 34 (2005).
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I. The Rise of Reality Television
The reality TV genre extends far back into the history of broadcasting. 
As one perceptive observer explained, proto-reality shows began some sixty 
years ago and included such fare as Candid Camera and Queen for a Day, 
the latter of which “began as a radio program, was shown on Los Angeles 
local television beginning in 1948, and was later picked up by NBC and subse-
quently, by ABC.”4
Although elements of reality TV have been present in television pro-
gramming since the beginning of the medium, unscripted shows did not truly 
hit their stride until 2000.  These shows “became a phenomenon around the 
turn of the millennium.  In the United States, Survivor, Big Brother, and 
other high-profile primetime reality programs (many adapted from existing 
European formats) arrived in 2000, setting the stage for a reconfiguration of 
television schedules that continues to this day.”5
The genre continued to grow in subsequent years, with a mind-bending 
array of different subgenres.  “By the mid–2000s, major broadcast and special-
ized cable channels alike were awash with makeover shows, dating shows, every 
manner of lifestyle and self-help program, reality sitcoms, talent contests and 
game shows, charitable interventions, adventure competitions, docu-soaps, and 
more.”6  Reality TV also began to influence existing television genres by, for 
example, steering nature and science programming to reflect the conventions 
of the reality format.7  For example, programming on the Animal Planet chan-
nel, such as Meerkat Manor, eschewed the traditional style of “slow moving 
and subdued nature programming” and instead often sought to “mimic out-
right the conventions of docusoaps and reality competitions.”8
Television ratings in 2016 demonstrate the enduring popularity of reality 
fare.  For example, in the week of June 27–July 3, in broadcast and cable real-
ity shows captured seven of the top ten positions: America’s Got Talent, The 
Bachelorette, American Ninja Warrior, Big Brother (3 episodes), and Love and 
Hip Hop Atlanta.9  During that same week, the top three cable series were real-
ity shows: Love and Hip Hop Atlanta, Keeping Up with the Kardashians, and 
Black Ink Crew.10  This is a truly remarkable dominance for a genre that barely 
existed sixteen years earlier.
4 Katie Hopkins, Unique Legal Considerations in Reality Television, 13 Pitt. J. Tech. L. & 
Pol’y 1, 2 (2012).
5 Ouellette, supra note 2, at 1.
6 Id. at 1–2.
7 Id. at 2.
8 Id.
9 Andy Dehnart, Reality TV is Dominating Broadcast and Cable Ratings This Sum-
mer, Reality Blurred (July 13, 2016 8:00 AM), https://www.realityblurred.com/ 
realitytv/2016/07/reality-summer-ratings-domination [https://perma.cc/8R8T-MQAD].
10 Id.
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Given the enormous importance of ratings in the television business, the 
urge to copy others’ successes is, of course, ever present.  One industry observer 
explained the rationale thus:
If Ice Road Truckers is a hit on one network you can be sure that a rival 
channel will be seeking a meeting with the producers to get trucking with 
them.  The fear factor in programming means that even as they search for 
the next big thing, networks will be bringing in the clones and avoiding 
things that have never been done.  There’s just too much money riding on 
every decision.11
It is this urge to appropriate the successful programming of others that 
drives the litigation explored herein.
II. Copyright Doctrine and Television Formats
Producers and television executives seeking to protect programs from 
close appropriators have long faced significant difficulties in copyright infringe-
ment litigation.  In one early format battle, Richards v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System,12 the plaintiff claimed that his script for a television quiz show about 
movies, Name the Star, was infringed by CBS’s own quiz show, Bank on the 
Stars.  A federal district court concluded that both shows contained a number 
of similar elements, including “an introduction, a description of the contest, a 
conversational interview with each contestant, the asking of questions related 
to motion pictures, a final ‘jackpot’ type of question, and a conclusion.”13 
Despite these similarities, the court granted summary judgment to CBS, stat-
ing that “it seems quite clear to the court that these two programs are basically 
dissimilar expressions in the broadcasting medium of the broad idea of a ‘quiz 
show based on motion pictures.’”14
As illustrated by Richards, infringement cases based largely on format 
typically run aground on one (or a combination) of two key copyright doc-
trines.  First, the idea/expression dichotomy makes clear that copyright 
protection extends only to the actual expression of the plaintiff, not to ideas, 
which are unprotectable and remain in the public domain.  As the Copyright 
Act states, protection does not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle or discovery.”15  Thus, for example, the 
famous and almost inevitable romantic comedy structure of “boy meets girl, 
11 Michael Rose, The Unreal Rise of Reality Television, Huffington Post (Sept. 23, 
2013, 4:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-rose/the-unreal-rise-of- 
realit_b_3976751.html [https://perma.cc/3KXB-HZEH].  See also, e.g., Ouellette, 
 supra note 2, at 2 (writing that the “success of the prime-time network reality shows 
begat imitations and variations on themes pitched to specialized cable audiences.”).
12 Richards v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 161 F. Supp. 516, 517 (D.D.C. 1958). 
13 Id. at 518. 
14 Id. at 519.
15 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2016). 
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boy loses girl, boy and girl reunite and live happily ever after” is not protect-
able since it functions at a high level of abstraction and is simply an idea for 
a screenplay.  This plot structure is in the public domain and is available to all 
creators.  With the addition of sufficient particulars, including developing the 
boy and girl characters, providing a setting and a more detailed plot, creating 
dialogue, and the like, the “boy meets girl” idea can morph into protectable 
expression in the form of a “rom-com” screenplay.
However, the line between idea and expression in the law has always 
been a blurry one.16  Famed appellate judge Learned Hand provided what has 
become the iconic statement of this problem in 1930 in his noted opinion in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures.17  In Nichols, an infringement action involving a 
stage play, Hand formulated his famous “abstractions” approach to the idea/
expression dichotomy:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is 
left out.  The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement 
of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there 
is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, 
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, 
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.18
In a later case, emphasizing the inescapable imprecision of this for-
mulation, Hand made clear that applications of the abstractions test 
“must . . . inevitably be ad hoc.”19
The developmental stage of some reality plaintiffs’ works may make them 
particularly susceptible to dismissal by courts as mere ideas.  This is because 
plaintiffs often come armed only with “treatments,” brief summaries of a pro-
gram’s concept that run only a few pages.  These purely conceptual synopses 
are rarely able to generate much of what of what a federal court would regard 
as developed expression.  Of course, some reality plaintiffs come to court with 
fully fledged and produced programs, which are more likely to contain protect-
able expression.
A second consistent legal stumbling block for reality TV plaintiffs is the 
doctrine of scenes a faire, or stock scenes that naturally occur in a given genre.
Scenes a faire (literally, “scenes that must be done”) include stock plot 
elements, characters, and other literary devices that are so standard as to be 
almost obligatory in connection with a particular theme or setting.  As one 
commentator put it, “a car chase, the kiss in a love scene, and the all-know-
ing butler are examples of hackneyed narrative devices that fall within the 
16 For a critique of the doctrine, see, e.g., Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichoto-
my in Copyright Law, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 321 (1989).
17 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
18 Id. at 121.
19 Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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doctrine.”20  Similarly, pickup trucks, cheating on one’s romantic partner, 
inebri ation, and honky-tonks would almost certainly constitute scenes a faire 
in the country music genre.  Considered a subcategory of unprotectable ideas, 
the scenes a faire doctrine ensures that “expressions which are indispensable 
to a common theme will remain in the public domain to the benefit of all, and 
the author will not possess the exclusive right to ideas which are also necessary 
to that theme.”21
Despite the formidable barriers posed by the idea/expression dichotomy 
and the scenes a faire doctrine, a glimmer of hope for plaintiffs does exist: Some 
level of protection is available to a reality TV plaintiff who simply deploys 
a variety of unprotectable ideas or stock scenes.  The trick here is that the 
selection or arrangement of those elements must be original overall.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Feist Publications. v. Rural Telephone 
Service22 held that even elements that cannot be protected could find copy-
right protection through the particular selection and arrangement imposed 
by a creator.  As the Court expressed it, public domain elements (specifically, 
compilations of facts in Feist) are protected to the extent they are “selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole con-
stitutes an original work of authorship.”23  According to Feist, the selection or 
arrangement must be original, although that requirement is “not particularly 
stringent”24—the selection or arrangement simply “cannot be so mechanical 
or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.”25  Still, the Feist court noted 
that the protection accorded to factual compilations based on selection and 
arrangement is “thin,”26 meaning that any protection only applies to the partic-
ular selection and arrangement and not to the raw facts themselves, which are 
always available for all to use.
The logic of Feist has since been extended by some lower courts from 
the context of factual compilations to other public domain elements, such as 
ideas.  For example, in Metcalf v. Bochco,27 the Ninth Circuit found that a large 
group of similar elements in a TV premise—which could not be protected on 
their own—created substantial similarity under that circuit’s “extrinsic test” 
sufficient to avoid summary judgment.  The case arose when writers Jerome 
and Laurie Metcalf offered several iterations of a treatment involving “a 
20 Marshall A. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law 88 (5th ed. 2010).  For a deeper 
treatment, see Leslie Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes A Faire Doctrine, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 79 
(1989).
21 Andrew B. Hebl, A Heavy Burden: Proper Application of Copyright’s Merger and Scenes 
a Faire Doctrines, 8 Wake Forest Intell. Prop. L.J. 128, 142 (2007).
22 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
23 Id. at 356 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
24 Id. at 358.
25 Id. at 362.
26 Id. at 349.
27 Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2002).
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story about a county hospital in inner-city Los Angeles and the struggles of 
its predominantly black staff” to producer Steven Bochco.28  Bochco read the 
treatments but declined to become involved.  Later, Bochco wrote and pro-
duced the CBS television series City of Angels, also about the black staff at 
an inner-city L.A. hospital, which the Metcalfs claimed infringed their work.29
The panel in Metcalf applied the Ninth Circuit’s “extrinsic test” for sub-
stantial similarity, a test that analyzes objective features of works and is the 
only test applied on summary judgment.30  (An intrinsic test—a purely subjec-
tive analysis by the fact finder, typically a jury, of “whether the total concept 
and feel of the two works are substantially similar”31—is also applied by courts 
in the Ninth Circuit at trial, if the extrinsic test is met.)  The extrinsic test 
focuses on “articulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, 
setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events”32 in the two works.  The court 
found the similarities between the two works to be “striking”:
Both the Metcalf and Bochco works are set in overburdened county hos-
pitals in inner-city Los Angeles with mostly black staffs.  Both deal with 
issues of poverty, race relations and urban blight.  The works’ main charac-
ters are both young, good-looking, muscular black surgeons who grew up in 
the neighborhood where the hospital is located.  Both surgeons struggle to 
choose between the financial benefits of private practice and the emotional 
rewards of working in the inner city.  Both are romantically involved with 
young professional women when they arrive at the hospital, but develop 
strong attractions to hospital administrators.  Both new relationships flour-
ish and culminate in a kiss, but are later strained when the administrator 
observes a display of physical intimacy between the main character and his 
original love interest.33
Although the court found these and other similarities to be cumulatively 
remarkable, it did acknowledge that they were largely either ideas or scenes a 
faire and thus not protectable individually.  Nonetheless, the combination of 
these elements satisfied the extrinsic test: “The particular sequence in which 
an author strings a significant number of unprotectable elements can itself be a 
protectable element.”34  Thus, in Metcalf, the defendant was able to essentially 
bootstrap unprotectable ideas and stock scenes into protectable expression 
through selection and arrangement, just as the Feist Court had acknowledged 
was possible for facts in compilations.  As the Metcalf court expressed it, 
28 Id. at 1071.
29 Id. at 1072.
30 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2004).
31 Robert C. Osterberg & Eric C. Osterberg, Substantial Similarity in Copyright Law 
3–21 (2008).
32 Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1073 (citation omitted).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1074.  See also, e.g., 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.09 (2016) (discussing possible 
copyrightability of television formats based on Feist).
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“[e]ach note in a scale, for example, is not protectable, but a pattern of notes in 
a tune may earn copyright protection.”35
The result in Metcalf was also seemingly influenced by the so-called 
“inverse ratio” rule applied in the Ninth Circuit36—the fact that the defendant 
acknowledged a high level of access to the plaintiffs’ work essentially lowered 
the bar for similarity under the extrinsic test.  As the court noted, not only had 
Bochco conceded access, but there were claims that Bochco and City of Angels 
star Michael Warren had both read and liked three different versions of the 
plaintiffs’ script.  “If the trier of fact were to believe that Warren and Bochco 
actually read the scripts, as alleged by the Metcalfs,” the court wrote, “it could 
easily infer that the many similarities between plaintiffs’ scripts and defen-
dants’ work were the result of copying, not mere coincidence.”37
Although Metcalf concerned a scripted dramatic series, the implications 
for reality TV jurisprudence are clear.  To the extent a reality producer can 
arrange stock elements into some original pattern, that arrangement itself can 
be protected via copyright doctrine.  Even though the Ninth Circuit has found 
ways to limit the precedential force of Metcalf in ensuing years,38 the case is still 
good law and certainly seems to have solid doctrinal backing as a result of Feist.
III. Reality Show Protection via Copyright—The Early Years
Early reality copyright jurisprudence protected defendants in almost 
every reported case,39 generally on the theory that the claimed infringement 
consisted of ideas or scenes a faire.  Consider, for example, CBS Broadcasting 
v. ABC., a 2003 district court opinion that analyzed claims by CBS that its hit 
reality show Survivor was infringed by ABC’s I’m a Celebrity, Get Me Out of 
35 Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1074.
36 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
37 Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1075.
38 Jenny Small, The Illusion of Copyright Infringement Protection, 12 Chi.-Kent J. In-
tell. Prop. 217, 220–21 (2013) (writing that “courts have interpreted Metcalf narrowly 
and determined that a pattern of similarity alone may not suffice to show substantial 
similarity.”).
39 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see, e.g., Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 
1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding summary judgment on copyright claim against show 
revealing secrets of magicians since similarities were generic); CBS Broad., Inc. v. Am. 
Broad. Co., Inc., No. CV 12-04073 GAF (JEMx), 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 13013027 (C.D. Cal. 
June 21, 2012) (denying injunctive relief on behalf of Big Brother owner against owners 
of The Glass House); Milano v. NBC Universal, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) (granting summary judgment on copyright claims against owners of The Biggest 
Loser); Zella v. E.W. Scripps Co., 529 F. Supp.2d 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (granting motion 
to dismiss over copyright claims alleged against owners of cooking show Rachel Ray); 
Bethea v. Burnett, No. CV 04-7690-JFW (PLAx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46944 (C.D. 
Cal. June 28, 2005) (granting summary judgment motion on copyright claim against 
owners of The Apprentice). 
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Here (Celebrity).40  CBS sought a preliminary injunction against the broadcast 
of Celebrity.  Both shows involved stranding a group of contestants (ordinary 
people in Survivor, celebrities in Celebrity) in a hostile landscape where they 
are asked to perform tasks.  The court easily determined that Celebrity was 
not infringing, basing a large part of its analysis on the idea/expression dichot-
omy and the scenes a faire doctrine.41  The CBS court acknowledged, in the 
abstract, that unprotected elements could potentially be combined in an origi-
nal manner such that the combination itself was protectable.  The court quoted 
a district court in the Second Circuit for the proposition that “even [where] a 
television game show is made up of entirely stock devices, an original selection, 
organization and presentation of such devices can nevertheless be protected.”42 
Nonetheless, the CBS court found that the precise selection or arrangement of 
such elements were not present in both works.  For example, the court noted 
that “Celebrity . . . adds significant elements not found in Survivor, including 
elements of the Celebrity tabloid genre and the audience participation ele-
ment of the game show genre.  Thus the combination of elements  .  .  .  is not 
congruent.”43
As to the protectable expression contained in the two shows, the court also 
found significant differences, including a comedic tone in Celebrity in contrast 
to the “unalterable seriousness” of Survivor.44  The court also distinguished the 
production values of the two shows, finding Survivor’s look to consist of  “lush, 
artful photography,” while Celebrity had the feel of “home video.”45  These and 
other differences (including the demeanor of the hosts, the conduct of the con-
testants, the music, and other elements) led the court to conclude that CBS was 
not likely to succeed in demonstrating substantial similarity.
Yet another decisive early-stage victory for a reality TV defendant came 
in an unpublished decision by a New Jersey district court in 2008, Pino v. Via-
com.46  In Pino, the plaintiff had created a treatment and a screenplay titled 
Under Pressure for a “sports reality show featuring contests between 
40 CBS Broad., Inc. v. ABC, No. 02-Civ-8813 (LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 13, 2003); Williams v. A&E Television Networks, 122 F. Supp. 3d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(granting motion to dismiss on copyright claim against owners of Married at First Sight); 
Castorina v. Spike Cable Networks, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting 
motion to dismiss on copyright claim against owners of Pros v. Joes). 
41 CBS Broad., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258, at *5–8.
42 Id. at *8–9 (quoting Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., No. 86-Civ-
5037 (EW), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146, 5 U.S. P.Q. 2d 1887, 1891 (S.D.N.Y. January 4, 
1988)).
43 CBS Broad., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258, at *21–22 (italics added). 
44 Id. at *25–26.
45 Id. at *29.
46 Pino v. Viacom, Inc., No. 07-3313 (AET), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24453 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 
2008).
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professional athletes and amateur athletes.”47  Under Pressure consisted of, 
among other elements, two announcers, a female interviewer, various “pres-
sure situations” in which the amateurs competed against professionals, and 
commentary on the amateurs by the professionals.48
The plaintiff contended that the Spike TV reality program Pros vs. Joes 
infringed Under Pressure.  Pros vs. Joes was also premised on amateur contes-
tants competing against professional athletes.  Among the consistent elements 
were “trash-talking” among the competitors, a host, and various “Match-Ups” 
in which the “Joes” took on the “Pros”—sometimes in the professional’s sport, 
sometimes not.49
The court, on an alternate motion to either dismiss or grant summary 
judgment, easily granted the motion.  The court found the programs’ common-
alities non-infringing:
[E]lements common to both works, including . . . the presence of hosts who 
provide witty commentary on the contestants and competition, introductory 
sequences that feature highlights of sporting events and sounds associated 
with various sports, spotlights on professional athletes and amateur contes-
tants, camera shots of athletic fields or arenas, trash-talking exchanges, and 
sports contests are scenes a faire that flow necessarily from the idea of a 
sports-themed reality show that pits amateurs against professional athletes.50
As to the protectable elements of Under Pressure, the court found that 
the plot, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and sequence of events were sufficiently 
different from those elements in Pros vs. Joes that the two works were not sub-
stantially similar.51  For example, as to the “plot,” the court found that Pros vs. 
Joes provided an objective scoring system whereby the Joes could win by out-
performing other Joes.  On the other hand, Under Pressure required that the 
amateur actually outperform the professional, and that performance was not 
rated objectively, but rather by a panel of judges.52
The Pino court also rejected Metcalf–style substantial similarity based 
on the selection or arrangement of unprotectable elements.53  The court noted 
the plaintiff did not “allege or identify any sequence of uncopyrightable ele-
ments in Pros vs. Joes that is similar to any in Under Pressure so as to approach 
the extent of similarity and identity in Metcalf.  At best, Plaintiff lists random 
similarities between elements of the shows in support of his argument.”54  As a 
result of this less-than-striking similarity, the court found that the plaintiff had 
not satisfied the extrinsic test and granted summary judgment to Viacom.
47 Id. at *2.
48 Id. at *4–5.
49 Id. at *6–8.
50 Id. at *14.
51 Id. at *15–20.
52 Pino, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24453 at *15–16.
53 Id. at *20–24.
54 Id. at *22.
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IV. Plaintiffs Make a Comeback of Sorts
Although early reality doctrine was essentially a shutout of plaintiffs 
(as indeed are some cases up to the time of this writing),55 a few recent deci-
sions suggest that format cases may not be completely unwinnable from the 
plaintiff’s side.  At the very least, plaintiffs have been able to ward off early 
dismissals in opinions that recognize potentially protectable elements in the 
shows.  This is by no means a sea change in reality show jurisprudence, but it is 
nonetheless legally significant since it suggests that the door may be opening 
a crack for copyright plaintiffs in reality cases.  Consider, for example, Dillon 
v. NBCUniversal Media, a 2013 case decided by a California federal district 
court, heard on a motion to dismiss.56  In Dillon, the plaintiff, Richard Dillon, a 
former police officer, wrote a treatment for Celebrity Seals, “a reality show that 
pits celebrity contestants against one another in competitive events designed 
to mimic the training received by Navy SEALs.”57  In the treatment, the celebri-
ties would each have a personal ex-military coach and have their performance 
on various military skills challenges judged by experts.  The treatment also 
called for the celebrities to “live together in a military barracks” and “behave 
‘in a regimented manner as well as do menial tasks, all under the supervision 
of their tough coaches.’”58
Dillon met with David A. Hurwitz, a producer, who praised the treatment 
but declined further involvement.  Later, Hurwitz, along with producers Mark 
Burnett and Dick Wolf, created Stars Earn Stripes, a reality show that aired for 
one season.  Dillon claimed the show infringed his treatment.  Because of the 
procedural posture of the case, the court construed the allegations in the peti-
tion in favor of the plaintiff.
On the issue of substantial similarity, the court, applying the Ninth Circuit’s 
extrinsic test,59 found enough similarities between the two works to overcome 
the motion to dismiss.  The court expressly stated that it was overlooking stock 
elements “such as a host, celebrity contestants, contestants living in close 
proximity with one another, contestant interviews, competitions between con-
testants, . . . the elimination of contestants,” and the like.60  Nonetheless, even 
overlooking these scenes a faire, the district court found protectable similar 
elements in theme and mood—both works were reverent toward the military 
and the service performed by military personnel.  The plots of the two works 
also contained significant similarities, the court reasoned, including the specific 
55 See recent cases cited in note 39. 
56 Dillon v. NBC Universal Media, LLC, CV 12-09728, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100733 (C.D. 
Cal. June 18, 2013).
57 Id. at *2.
58 Id. at *3.
59 See Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(explaining elements of extrinsic test).
60 Dillon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100733, at *13.
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tasks the contestants were called upon to carry out.  Dillon’s treatment fea-
tured “‘heavy weapons qualification,’ ‘over-the-beach scenarios and ambush 
techniques,’ and ‘sniper lessons,’” while Stars Earn Stripes had episodes with 
very similar tasks.61  Although one might argue that such archetypical martial 
activities should constitute scenes a faire in a military-based reality show, the 
court considered them protectable.
The court found little protectable similarity in either dialogue or set-
ting, the former because of the unscripted nature of the works and the latter 
because Stars Earn Stripes did not, unlike the treatment, depict the contestants 
living together in barracks or performing menial tasks.  However, the court did 
find the treatment’s “list of proposed celebrity contestants [to be] uncannily 
similar to the contestants chosen to participate in the Program.”62  For instance, 
Dillon had proposed Drew Lachey from the boy band 98 Degrees as a possi-
ble contestant, while Stars Earn Stripes featured Drew’s brother and fellow 
98 Degrees member, Nick Lachey, on the show.  Other similarities in casting 
between the two works included former professional wrestlers, former Danc-
ing with the Stars contestants, and, as hosts, former members of the military 
who had subsequently entered politics.  As the court put it, “other similarities 
abound.”63  One might question the analysis here—the “characters” in ques-
tion are not fictional creations, but actual flesh-and-blood human beings.  Are 
they subject to copyright protection when their names and attributes arise as 
possible casting choices?  As a doctrinal matter, is it an “idea” if a casting direc-
tor says, “get me a ‘boy band’ type”?  Nonetheless, the court seemed to feel, 
with little explicit analysis, that these kinds of choices were protectable ele-
ments of the treatment, at least in the context of a motion to dismiss.
Given the similarities in theme and mood, plot, and characters—all ele-
ments of the extrinsic test—the court reasoned that it could not “conclude that 
[the works] are not substantially similar on the pleadings.  This is especially true 
in light of the high degree of access alleged by Plaintiff.”64  The latter statement 
is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s “inverse ratio” principle mentioned earlier. 
In essence, a high degree of access—in this case, Dillon had personally provided 
the treatment to an individual who went on to become a creator of the allegedly 
infringing work—permits “a lower standard of proof of substantial similarity.”65
Another recent case from a Texas federal district court rejected a defen-
dant’s summary judgment motion in a case involving a fishing reality show. 
In Parker v. Outdoor Channel Holdings,66 the plaintiff, Ewell Parker, created 
61 Id. at *16.
62 Id. at *17.
63 Id. at *18. 
64 Id. at *19.
65 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 2004).
66 Parker v. Outdoor Channel Holdings, No. 2-11-CV-00159-J, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
175879 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2012).
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Match Fishing, a competitive bass-fishing series, and registered copyrights in 
both competition rules and nine specific episodes, four of which he produced 
on video.67  Parker alleged that Outdoor Channel infringed his copyrights 
through a program called Ultimate Match Fishing.68
Parker claimed sixteen protectable elements derived from his rules and 
the shows (including both produced shows and treatments for unproduced 
shows) that he asserted Outdoor Channel had infringed.  These included: “[t]
wo competitors in a one-on-one competition fishing out of the same boat”; 
“[e]ach round of the competition, a match, being divided into four periods”; 
selection of the competitor controlling the boat via coin toss; the winner of 
the match determined by the weight of fish caught; putting microphones on 
the competitors; and “[e]ncouraging talk and banter between the competi-
tors to draw viewers into the drama of the competition.”69  The court engaged 
in an exhaustive analysis of all sixteen elements claimed by the plaintiff to 
determine if there were sufficient protectable elements to defeat summary 
judgment.  Moreover, the court also noted that—in line with, but without citing 
Metcalf—”[e]ven if all divisible elements of a work are filtered out as unpro-
tected, the copyrighter’s selection and arrangement of otherwise unprotected 
elements can be protectable, if original.”70
The court concluded that a number of the claimed elements, such as 
dividing the match into four periods or placing microphones on the competi-
tors, were not original to the plaintiff’s program.71  Additionally, some elements, 
such as weight penalties against competitors for rules violations, were common 
enough in fishing competitions to constitute scenes a faire, in the court’s view.72 
Nonetheless, the court ultimately concluded that the protectable elements, 
along with the element of selection and arrangement itself, were sufficient 
for the plaintiff to avoid summary judgment: “Without saying that substan-
tial similarity does exist, a reasonable jury could determine that it does,” the 
court wrote.73
Unquestionably, the Parker court could be criticized for some of its anal-
ysis.  For instance, in evaluating scenes a faire arguments by the defendant, the 
court reasoned that the “topic” of the analysis should be “televised bass fishing 
competitions” rather than “sports competitions.”74  This significant narrowing 
of the topic area meant in practice that an element such as alternating con-
trol of the boat by competitors was analyzed thus in terms of scenes a faire: 
67 Id. at *2.
68 Id. at *3.
69 Id. at *3–5.
70 Id. at *9.
71 Id. at *14–15.
72 Id. at *14–15.
73 Id. at *17.
74 Id. at *11–13.
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“[A]lternation of control is common to sports competitions generally; it is 
apparently uncommon to televised bass fishing competitions.”75  Similarly, the 
court reasoned that using a coin toss to determine which competitor is in con-
trol at the beginning of the match or having a uniformed referee were common 
elements in sporting competitions generally, but not necessarily in televised 
bass fishing competitions.76  This approach seems to be slicing things quite 
thinly indeed and might not stand up on appeal.
Moreover, protection for Parker’s competition rules (as opposed to the 
expression contained in the shows) might potentially transgress the rule in 
Baker v. Seldon,77 a seminal 1879 Supreme Court copyright case in which the 
Court held that a copyright in instructions in a book did not forbid practicing 
the process the book described.  Thus, one might argue, Parker’s competition 
regime might not be protected if an infringer carried out a competition using 
those rules.  The Parker court did not cite Baker, however, so that issue was not 
addressed in the opinion.  Despite potential problems in parts of the analysis, 
Parker is a decidedly plaintiff-friendly decision that, like Dillon, may herald a 
somewhat less skeptical judicial attitude toward reality-based copyright claims.
V. Trademark and Trade Dress Claims
Attempts by reality TV plaintiffs to deploy trademark and trade dress 
claims to protect their work have largely failed in the reported cases.  Trademark 
law, unlike copyright’s protection of literary and artistic works, “is concerned 
with protection of the symbols, elements or devices used to identify a prod-
uct in the marketplace and to prevent confusion as to its source.”78  Trademark 
infringement is premised on a “likelihood of confusion” by consumers, which is 
determined by a complex, multifactor test that varies somewhat by federal cir-
cuit.79  The Lanham Act, which governs federal trademark law, also provides a 
cause of action for trademark dilution.80
One reality TV case in which a trademark theory failed is RDF Media v. 
Fox Broadcasting,81 decided in 2005 by a California district court.  RDF owned 
rights to Wife Swap US and Wife Swap UK, both reality programs in which 
spouses from different families traded places and, presumably, hilarity ensued. 
75 Id. at *14.
76 Id.
77 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).  The case is now codified at Copyright Act,17 U.S.C.S. 
§ 102 (2016), the statutory section that includes the idea/expression dichotomy.
78 EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63 (2d 
Cir. 2000).
79 Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion in Trademark Law (2001); Barton 
Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 Ca-
lif. L. Rev. 1581 (2006).
80 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2016).  See also David S. Welkowitz, Trademark Dilution: Federal, 
State, and International Law (2002).
81 RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox. Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 556 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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Fox began broadcasting Trading Spouses, the alleged knockoff, in 2004.  In 
addition to the predictable copyright claims, RDF added two counts of trade 
dress infringement under the Lanham Act.  Trade dress has been defined as 
“the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, 
color or color combinations, texture, [or] graphics.”82  Standard examples 
of trade dress claims include the distinctive shapes of certain liquor bottles, 
the famous Tiffany blue box, and even the overall design of highly distinc-
tive restaurants.83  Although trade dress claims are conceptually distinct from 
standard trademark infringement, both are grounded in protecting consumers 
from confusion in the marketplace, and, as the RDF Media court put it, “the 
legal significance of the difference is limited.”84
The court easily dispensed with the trade dress claims on a motion to dis-
miss.  The court summarized RDF’s claim:
The total image and appearance of “Wife Swap US,” as defined by the 
selection, compilation, arrangement, sequence, and combination of the 
cast of characters, . . . the sequence of events, the plot, the tone, the theme, 
the pace,  .  .  .  the topics explored, the dramatic and comedic effect cre-
ated by music, and the introductory segment, constitutes the trade dress of 
“Wife Swap US.”85
This claim was a bridge too far for the court, which reasoned that “[i]
n effect, RDF is asking this Court to recognize the reality show itself as the 
trade dress subject to protection.”86  This it could not do since the actual con-
tent of the work was the province of copyright law, not the Lanham Act.  The 
RDF Media court quoted famed trademark scholar J. Thomas McCarthy for 
the proposition that the “collection of words in a novel are not a ‘trademark’ 
indicating the origin of that novel.  Rather, the story is a ‘product,’ not a symbol 
of origin.”87
RDF argued that a 2001 Ninth Circuit case involving rival billiards estab-
lishments, Clicks Billiards v. Sixshooters,88 supported its trade dress claim.  In 
the billiards case, which concerned the visual design of the two businesses, the 
Ninth Circuit had held that “[t]rade dress is the composite tapestry of visual 
effects.”89  The RDF Media court rejected the analogy to reality programs, rea-
soning that the billiards case involved simply the overall look of the billiard 
82 LeSportsac, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985).
83 Naomi Straus, Trade Dress Protection for Cuisine: Monetizing Creativity in a Low-IP 
Industry, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 182, 196–97 (2012).
84 RDF Media, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 562 n.2 (citing Score, Inc. v. Cap Cities/ABC Inc., 724 F. 
Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
85 Id. at 562–63.
86 Id. at 563.
87 Id. (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 6:5 (4th ed. 2004)).
88 Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2001).
89 Id. at 1259.
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halls rather than the totality of what they provided to customers.90  Moreover, 
if the plaintiff in the billiards case had been denied a trade dress claim, it would 
have had no remedy, since copyright would not have protected the relevant 
elements.  RDF, however, already had a remedy since “the ‘composite tapestry 
of visual effects’ is the program, that is, the product itself, which is protectable, 
if at all, under copyright law.”91  Although the court did not say this, a reason-
able Lanham Act argument could be made that trade dress doctrine might 
support a claim involving an iconic set on which a reality program was filmed, 
since that could indeed function as an indicator of source (that is, function as a 
trademark) for the audience.  However, it seems a clear overreach, as the court 
concluded, for a plaintiff to claim that the entirety of the program acts as an 
indicator of source.
Any reality TV claim couched in terms of trademark that occurs at the 
intersection with copyright law must, in any event, overcome the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film,92 an important prece-
dent distinguishing the domain of copyright from that of trademark.  In Dastar, 
the Court rejected Lanham Act claims in the case of a defendant who mar-
keted as its own footage from a television series that had fallen into the public 
domain.93  The defendant did not indicate the original source of the mate-
rial, now uncopyrighted, and drew claims for “reverse passing off” under the 
Lanham Act since the original creators of the underlying work had not been 
credited.94  The court rejected the application of the Lanham Act to these facts: 
[T]he phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act . . . refers to the producer 
of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any 
idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.  To hold other-
wise would be akin to finding that [the Lanham Act] created a species of 
perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do.95
The implication of Dastar is that owners of creative works—even those 
still under copyright—cannot use trademark doctrine to protect the content 
of various expressive works.  As one court summarized, “the clear import of 
Dastar is that any protection for the misappropriation of [e.g., a television 
show’s] content comes from the Copyright Act, not from the Lanham Act.”96 
Thus Dastar seems to erect a formidable barrier against trademark claims mas-
querading as copyright claims in the reality TV context.
90 RDF Media, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
91 Id.
92 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
93 Id. at 38.
94 Id. at 27.
95 Id. at 37.
96 A Slice of Pie Prods., LLC v. Wayans Bros. Entm’t, 392 F. Supp. 2d 297, 313 (D. Conn. 
2005).
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More quotidian uses of trademark law in reality contexts have tended to 
fail as well.  For example, the band Survivor, of “Eye of the Tiger” fame, could 
not prove a likelihood of confusion against the reality show Survivor in the 
sale of CDs and merchandise.97  In Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit conducted a 
lengthy analysis of a multifactor likelihood of confusion test and determined 
that the band had not met its evidentiary burden to demonstrate likely con-
fusion.  Among the factors examined, the court found that CBS had devoted 
considerable effort to distinguishing its brand from that of the band.  For exam-
ple, on all of the CBS merchandise, the mark “Survivor” was accompanied by 
“an oval background containing a drawing relevant to the season’s location, 
and the words, ‘Outplay, Outlast, Outwit.’”98  On the CDs, CBS had included 
language linking the music thereon to “the Hit CBS TV Series.”99  As the Sev-
enth Circuit put it, “CBS has taken extra steps to assure that their products are 
readily differentiated,”100 thus reducing the possibility of confusion among con-
sumers.  Moreover, the merchandise was not sold or advertised through similar 
outlets, and CBS offered a survey that showed no actual confusion between the 
two marks.101  Given the complete analysis, the court ruled that CBS’s mark did 
not infringe the band’s mark.
Although the reported case law is sparse in this area, it appears that 
trademark doctrine will not serve as a particularly fruitful avenue for reality 
TV plaintiffs.  While they certainly may be able to protect program names and 
logos against direct competitors, within the sort of limits suggested by Sullivan 
concerning likely confusion, more ambitious use of trademark law does not 
appear promising.  Thus far, there appear to have been few attempts to deploy 
the trademark dilution cause of action, which can have a broader reach than 
a classic infringement or trade dress claim, but dilution is also subject to the 
limitations of Dastar, which means its use will be barred when attempting to 
protect content in any significant way.
Conclusion
As this Article has suggested, intellectual property law has thus far 
offered limited aid to reality TV creators in their quest to protect their works. 
In trademark law, the few reported cases suggest that the Lanham Act will not 
offer tools of robust power to fend off appropriations, short of perhaps very 
close borrowing of a program’s name, slogan, or other indicia of source.
97 Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 777–79 (7th Cir. 2004); Stefan Bechtold, The Fash-
ion of TV Show Formats, 2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 451, 466 (2014). See also Surfvivor Me-
dia, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2005).
98 Sullivan v. CBS, 385 F.3d at 777.
99 Id. at 778.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 779.
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In the domain of copyright, the idea/expression dichotomy and scenes a 
faire doctrine continue to function as effective bars to most attempts to pro-
tect reality show format or content.  While the earliest reported cases led to 
consistent early dismissals on these grounds, a few more recent cases—in par-
ticular, Dillon and Parker—suggest a route to protection through the use of a 
Metcalf–style “compilation” of unprotectable ideas that achieves at least thin 
protection.  The influence of these two cases must of course be placed into 
context: They are trial court decisions with little precedential force.  More-
over, while successfully fending off an early dismissal can be the point at which 
settlement talks turn serious, these cases are not total victories by any means. 
Thus, while their perceived influence must be carefully circumscribed, the rea-
soning underlying these cases nonetheless provides some measure of hope that 
copyright protection may be available for reality TV plaintiffs.  This is particu-
larly true in cases that involve high levels of appropriation rather than random 
similarities.  The overall picture is thus predominantly negative, although with 
some modest hope for protection in the right circumstances.
